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ABOUT THE PROJECT
Begun in late 2012, this two-year project will 
explore and promote the ways that Canada and 
Australia can enhance their security cooperation 
and contribute to more stable regional security 
environments and governance mechanisms in the 
Asia-Pacific region.
The region has become an increasingly important 
area for the Canadian government’s international 
economic priorities. Regional security and stability 
are prerequisites to achieving these priorities, and 
given Australia’s tremendous success engaging 
with Asia-Pacific countries from trade and 
investment through to security, there is no better 
partner for Canada’s own broader engagement in 
the region.
CIGI and ASPI will explore the possibilities 
for Canadian and Australian cooperation in 
promoting strengthened security and regional 
governance in the Asia-Pacific. It will cover 
areas such as strategic policy, cooperation in 
foreign policy and defence initiatives, and closer 
military-to-military ties. The project will be led by 
Australian and Canadian co-chairs, advised by a 
binational council of prominent individuals and 
officials. The project’s research will contribute to 
discussions at the February 2014 Australia-Canada 
Economic Leadership Forum in Melbourne. The 
resulting report will be presented later in 2014 to 
both Australian and Canadian governments.
As an additional element, CIGI is working closely 
with two Korean partners — the Seoul Forum 
for International Affairs and the Asan Institute 
for Policy Studies — which will host one of the 
two regional workshops that form part of the 
project. It is expected that this workshop will also 
give important insights into the possibilities of 
Korean engagement with Canada and Australia in 
ongoing cooperation in the security domain.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
There are a number of strategic challenges currently 
affecting the Asia-Pacific. In a period of global uncertainty, 
China has emerged as a confident and powerful actor, 
while the ability of the United States to remain the region’s 
hegemonic power has come into question. Maritime 
boundary claims, regionalism and unresolved Cold 
War sovereignty disputes are a source of considerable 
uncertainty. A number of non-traditional security 
challenges are also emerging, including energy and food 
insecurity, cyber security and the threat of a climate 
catastrophe-related humanitarian crisis. Canada and 
Australia — resource-based economies with a record of 
bilateral and institutional engagement in the region, and 
important US allies — have an interest in these challenges, 
and in ensuring regional strategic stability that promotes 
economic growth. 
INTRODUCTION
The Asia-Pacific region is undergoing a strategic shift 
in a period of global uncertainty. China is emerging as a 
confident and powerful actor, while the United States is 
perceived as having diminished influence. The region’s 
geography — a predominantly maritime continent 
composed of several semi-enclosed seas — means that 
the Asia-Pacific is afflicted with undefined maritime 
boundaries at a time of growing state interest in rent 
earned from the sea. Notwithstanding its status as the 
world’s most economically vibrant region, the Asia-Pacific 
confronts a number of strategic challenges that are the 
source of considerable uncertainty.
These include:
• the rise of China and its active defence posture and 
military modernization;
• uncertainties surrounding the capacity and will of 
the United States to remain the region’s hegemonic 
power;
• overlapping maritime boundary claims that direct 
regional military spending to naval capabilities;
• the increasingly competitive nature of regionalism 
and the inability of regional security architecture to 
build trust between states; and
• unresolved Cold War sovereignty disputes on the 
Korean Peninsula and across the Taiwan Strait.
The first two challenges will likely define the future of the 
Asia-Pacific and play out in the latter three challenges, as 
well as globally. Non-traditional security challenges are 
also emerging, including energy and food insecurity, cyber 
security and the possibility of a large-scale humanitarian 
crisis caused by a climate catastrophe. Canadian and 
Australian national interests will be affected by these 
developments.
THE RISE OF CHINA
The first strategic shift that is affecting the Asia-Pacific 
is the rise of China and its concomitant foreign policy 
posture. Years of trying to assuage regional concerns 
about its rise have given way, since 2008, to a confidence 
that makes China less willing to tolerate perceived slights 
to its “core interests.” Debates over China’s rise have 
characterized the country as a revisionist rising power or 
as a state that owes its dramatic economic development to 
the liberal international system — it is both (Christensen, 
2006; Friedberg, 2005). Beijing has downplayed its rise by 
characterizing it as “peaceful” while also emphasizing 
China’s status as a developing country (Glaser and 
Medeiros, 2007). Avoiding conflict with the United 
States remains China’s overriding foreign policy priority 
as part of its strategy to create a peaceful international 
environment conducive to China’s economic development 
(Swaine and Tellis, 2000).
However, growth in Chinese material power has given 
way to a revised strategic outlook that still prefers to avoid 
confrontation, but is prepared to oppose perceived slights 
on issues that affect the rule of the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) (Heath, 2012). Using an anti-Japan, anti-US 
narrative that draws on China’s experience of exploitation 
at the hands of the West, the CCP has been able to tap into 
existing nationalist sentiments held by the Chinese people 
to legitimize its rule as the only party that can protect 
China from foreign interference, while ensuring continued 
economic growth (Gries, 2004; Zhao, 2004; Wang, 2008). 
This nationalist narrative has become integral to the rule 
of the CCP as its growth model has shifted from a socialist 
one to a capitalist one (Esteban, 2006; Dickson, 2004). 
Combined with China’s growth in material power, this 
narrative triggered revisions — towards a more assertive 
stance — of Japan policy in 2005 and towards “core 
interests” since 2009 (Gries, 2005; Swaine, 2010). Concern 
over China’s rise relates to two issues: the pace of and 
lack of transparency in its military modernization and the 
perception that its pursuit of “core interests” could cause 
one of Asia’s many territorial flashpoints to escalate. 
Chinese defence spending has been steadily increasing 
at double-digit rates since the onset of China’s economic 
reforms in 1979, despite being listed as the last of four 
priority areas. Yet, defence spending has been declining as 
a percentage of total government spending over the same 
period and spending on domestic security has exceeded 
declared defence spending since 2010 (Liff and Erickson, 
forthcoming 2013; Bloomberg News, 2013). However, 
China is widely criticized for a lack of transparency in 
the allocation of its defence budget, in particular the fact 
that research and development is not part of the declared 
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budget. Furthermore, the military has undergone a number 
of institutional and doctrinal reforms to allow the People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA) to conduct “local wars under 
conditions of informationization” (Office of the Secretary 
of Defense, 2012: 3). Despite Chinese assurances, the link 
between its growing defence budget and the military 
platforms it has purchased are a source of disquiet in the 
Asia-Pacific.
China’s military strategy has traditionally been focussed 
on reclaiming Taiwan through an overwhelming surgical 
strike designed to coerce Taipei’s surrender. China has 
deployed a number of short- and medium-range ballistic 
missiles to strike military targets in Taiwan, fourth-
generation fighter aircraft to establish aerial superiority 
and diesel-powered submarines and modern destroyers 
armed with anti-ship cruise missiles to strike at American 
carrier groups. Procurement priorities lie with the PLA 
Navy, Air Force and Strategic Missile Force. Beyond 
Taiwan, successive defence white papers have stressed the 
“protection of China’s maritime rights and interests” as a 
primary objective (State Council, 2000; 2002). While China 
has settled most of its land-based territorial disputes, it is 
party to a number of disputes over islands and maritime 
zones in the South China Sea and the East China Sea. 
Importantly, the platforms purchased to dissuade US 
involvement in a Taiwan Strait contingency are similar to 
those required to pursue disputed maritime claims. Two 
developments in 2011 suggest that China seeks a military 
with a global reach, which is consistent with the status 
associated with a ”great power.” First, China’s refurbished 
Ukrainian aircraft carrier underwent sea trials in August 
2012 and the navy has been training with aircraft takeoffs 
and landings. Second, China deployed a frigate to the 
Mediterranean to rescue Chinese citizens from Libya in 
February 2013. 
China has never tolerated slights to its territorial integrity, 
national development or internal political affairs. Selling 
arms to Taiwan, meeting with the Dalai Lama or supporting 
“separatist” activities have long been punished by Chinese 
condemnation, cancelled meetings and the downgrading 
of political ties. Since 2008, however, China seems more 
willing to use the instruments of its new-found material 
power to assert itself. This has included, but is not limited 
to, the deployment of its coast guard vessels to police its 
claimed maritime jurisdiction, the application of informal 
economic sanctions, the encouragement of consumer 
boycotts and the use of the PLA Navy to send political 
signals to its neighbours. For some states, China has 
fulfilled the long-held prophecy that it would become a 
belligerent in the East and South China Seas when it had 
accumulated sufficient military power (Klare, 2002: 109–
137; Salameh, 1995-1996; Chang, 1996). In this view, China 
uses its civilian maritime agencies to assert its maritime 
jurisdiction and sovereignty claims in the South China Sea 
against Vietnam and the Philippines, and against Japan 
in the East China Sea. Cutting the cables of Vietnamese 
survey vessels, detaining fishermen and forcing the release 
of fishermen detained by rival claimants are some of its 
most provocative actions (Thayer, 2011; Buszynski, 2012).
Furthermore, there is concern over Chinese command and 
control and foreign policy decision making in the context 
of its more capable military. It is unclear which Chinese 
actions are based on calculations of strategic interest, 
which are motivated by domestic calculations and which 
occur outside of Beijing’s control (Masuda et al., 2012). For 
instance, it is not clear whether the spate of incidents in 
East Asian waters in 2009–2011 was directed by Beijing, by 
local bureaucracies, including civilian maritime agencies, 
or some combination of both (International Crisis Group, 
2012). In March 2013, the National People’s Congress took 
steps to consolidate four of China’s coastal enforcement 
agencies into one (“Dragons Unite,” 2013). There is also a 
risk that the CCP may be sensitive to domestic legitimacy 
concerns in the event of a foreign policy crisis. By virtue 
of the scope of China’s domestic challenges and the CCP’s 
nationalist legitimizing narrative, the government of China 
may adopt a rigid posture for fear of domestic backlash.
These concerns have led to a dramatic reversal in regional 
perceptions of China’s rise. It is widely understood that 
in the years since the 1997 Asian financial crisis, East 
Asian states steadily warmed to the positive aspects of 
China’s emergence (Shambaugh, 2004-2005). Since 2008, 
there has been a sea change in regional thinking that is 
best demonstrated by comments made by Philippine 
Foreign Minister Albert del Rosario to the Financial Times.
Del Rosario stated that the Philippines would welcome 
“a rearmed Japan shorn of its pacifist constitution as a 
counterweight to the growing military assertiveness of 
China” (quoted in Pilling, Landingin and Soble, 2012). This 
statement is a direct result of tensions in maritime East 
Asia and presents a dramatic departure from the received 
wisdom that Japanese security policy still evokes concern 
from the region it once tried to conquer.
THE UNITED STATES: STILL THE 
HEGEMON?
China’s behavioural shift has paved the way for the 
forthright and explicit reassertion of American hegemony 
in the Asia-Pacific. The US hub and spokes alliance system 
is widely regarded as a central pillar of regional stability. 
Based on bilateral military alliances with Australia, Japan, 
South Korea, Thailand and the Philippines and supported 
by defence agreements with Malaysia, Singapore and 
New Zealand, the US military presence deters would-be 
aggressors and provides the public good of secure sea lanes 
of communication (SLOCs) (Ikenberry, 2004; Auer and 
Lim, 2001; Van Dyke, 2002; Dibb, 2000). American regional 
hegemony has kept the Asia-Pacific stable since the end 
of World War II, despite concerns of growing instability 
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caused by rising military spending, growing energy 
needs, disputed territories and unresolved historical 
legacies (Friedberg, 1993-1994; Betts, 1993-1994). In the 
wake of the 9/11 attacks, a perception grew that American 
preoccupation with the Middle East and the “war on 
terror” allowed China to pursue its regional interests more 
freely, although the US military presence in the region did 
not decline in real terms (Pempel, 2008; Green, 2008). The 
“rebalancing” announced by the Obama administration 
in 2011 is, thus, as much rhetorical and symbolic as it is 
substantive.
The rise of China and its bold reassertion of its maritime 
boundary claims present a considerable challenge to 
American regional hegemony, regardless of US efforts 
to ensure the emergence of a Chinese “responsible 
stakeholder” on global issues. Many American strategists 
believe that China’s strategic shift in 2009 was a function 
of a calculation that the capacity of the United States to 
support its hegemony in the Asia-Pacific would collapse 
as a consequence of military overextension in the Middle 
East, and due to the financial concerns that arose following 
the global financial crisis (Manning, 2013).
Recent events suggest growing Chinese dissatisfaction 
with the US military presence and diplomacy in the region. 
In March 2009,US government research vessels, including 
the USNS Impeccable, were confronted in China’s exclusive 
economic zone (EEZ). In late 2010, China condemned 
American plans to deploy the USS George Washington to 
the Yellow Sea as part of war games aimed at North Korea 
(“S. Korea, U.S. Conduct,” 2010). The Pentagon views these 
incidents, combined with the weapons platforms noted 
above, as part of an “anti-access, area denial” strategy 
to deny US forces access to regional seas (Office of the 
Secretary of Defense, 2010). Achieving such an objective 
would allow China to assert itself with respect to Taiwan 
and maritime boundary disputes, without the prospect 
of US interference. In July 2010, then Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton stated the US interest in peaceful resolution 
to territorial disputes and commitment to freedom of 
navigation at the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) Regional Forum (ARF) (Clinton, 2010). This 
statement reflects concern in Washington that China does 
not accept the basic principles of international maritime 
law that underwrite regional stability, in particular the 
freedom of navigation.1
This unease, combined with the Obama administration’s 
view that its force posture was overweighed to the Middle 
East, have led to a firm and unapologetic reassertion of US 
power to reassure allies of America’s commitment to the 
Asia-Pacific. In his address to the Australian Parliament 
in November 2011, President Obama stated unequivocally 
that “reductions in U.S. defense spending will not — I 
1 It should be noted that Vietnam, Malaysia and Thailand share the 
Chinese perspective on the legalities of military activities in the EEZ.
repeat, will not — come at the expense of the Asia Pacific” 
(Obama, 2011). The visit followed 18 months of accelerated 
American diplomatic activity in the region, during 
which US senior officials articulated their interests in the 
region’s maritime commons — navigational freedom and 
a peaceful resolution of disputes — and reassured Asian 
allies of America’s continued commitment to maintaining 
its military presence in the region (Clinton, 2011). Despite 
enduring skepticism about the United States’ capacity 
to maintain its regional military posture in light of its 
economic problems, senior US officials have repeatedly 
stated that cuts to defence spending will not come at the 
expense of forward-deployed forces in the Asia-Pacific 
(Obama, 2012; Bumiller, 2011). Then Secretary of Defense 
Leon Panetta (2012) noted at the 2012 Shangri-La Dialogue 
that 60 percent of the US Navy would be stationed in 
the Pacific by 2020. In addition to the US commitment to 
supply seapower to the Asia-Pacific, there seems to be 
growing demand for its military presence in the region. 
This growing demand for American power is a direct 
consequence of China’s perceived aggression in regional 
maritime affairs since 2009. States once accused of 
accommodating or “bandwagonning” with China’s rise, 
such as Vietnam and the Philippines, engaged in overt 
“external balancing” behaviour by seeking closer ties, 
or, in the case of the latter, security assurances from the 
United States. Chinese behaviour towards its claimed 
maritime boundaries elicited restatements of American 
security guarantees to the Philippines in 2011 and to Japan 
in 2010 and 2012. There is clearly still an appetite for US 
military power among East Asian states, although concern 
persists in Southeast Asia and South Korea that a balance 
must be maintained between the United States and China. 
This reassertion of American primacy comes as Sino-US 
defence ties remain poor. Bilateral military contacts are 
impaired by US weapons sales to Taiwan, which undermine 
efforts to increase transparency between the two militaries. 
This has become a vital concern in light of recent crises, such 
as the Impeccable incident in March 2009 (Dutton, 2010). 
Bilateral talks under the Maritime Consultative Mechanism 
are infrequent and the hotline between military officials is 
seldom used (Kan, 2010). China holds greater interaction 
between the two militaries hostage to developments in 
the United States’ Taiwan policy. It cancelled defence talks 
after the Obama administration sold weapons to Taiwan in 
January 2010. In September 2012, China unexpectedly and 
inexplicably refused to sign on to the Code for Unalerted 
Encounters at Sea developed under the auspices of the 
Western Pacific Naval Symposium. Nevertheless, efforts to 
engage China continue. China has been invited to the 2014 
Rim of the Pacific Exercise and Australian naval forces 
have conducted joint training exercises with their Chinese 
counterparts.
The United States’ rebalancing is an effort to strengthen 
the credibility of its regional security posture amidst 
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domestic resistance to costly international engagement. 
The “rebalancing” is squarely located within a broader 
discourse of American engagement with the Asia-Pacific 
region over the long term in an effort to tie America’s future 
with that of the Asia-Pacific (Green, 2013). US leaders 
are quick to emphasize the economic dimensions of the 
rebalancing, embodied by the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(TPP), as well as the political and humanitarian aspects 
(Kerry, 2013; Donilon, 2013). If Washington does intend 
to stay the course in the Asia-Pacific, however, it will 
increasingly rub against the preferences of a rising China 
and the risk of miscalculation in an increasingly crowded 
East Asian littoral will rise.
DISPUTED TERRITORIES AND 
MARITIME SPACE
A third source of strategic instability is the existence 
of disputed maritime claims that direct rising regional 
defence spending to navy and coast guard platforms. The 
region boasts numerous overlapping maritime boundary 
disputes (see map), a product of the geographical makeup 
of East Asia, with numerous semi-enclosed seas, disputed 
claims to sovereignty over rocks and islands, and the 
widespread ratification of the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The entitlement to 
make claims to maritime space is driven by the material 
importance of rent from the ocean in countries’ national 
development goals, including oil, gas, minerals and 
fisheries exploitation. Also, as a function of oversights in 
the San Francisco Peace Treaty that ended World War II in 
Asia, the region is home to numerous territorial disputes 
over islands and rocks (Hara, 2007). These issues are further 
exacerbated by the negative images many states hold of 
their territorial rivals as a result of unsettled historical 
grievances relating to perceived injustices suffered at the 
hands of other states. The political salience of nationalism 
in East Asia has hardened state postures, prevented 
accommodation between claimant states and even been a 
source of escalation. There is no better demonstration of 
this than the efforts of conservative Japanese politician 
Shintaro Ishihara to provoke a crisis with China over the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu islands by attempting to buy them on 
behalf of the city of Tokyo in 2012.
Since UNCLOS came into force in 1994, all East Asian 
states have become more interested in maritime space as 
a source of revenue for their national development goals. 
Asia leads the world in fish consumption and production, 
and in the number of people employed in fisheries 
industries, including aquaculture. Asia boasts 74 percent of 
the world’s fishing vessels and China alone is responsible 
for 34 percent of global fish production (Food and 
Agriculture Organization [FAO], 2012: 3–12). Furthermore, 
according to the US Department of Energy, the South 
China Sea contains 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, 
the importance of which will grow as Asian economies 
look to gas to power their economies (Energy Information 
Administration, 2013: 2). Natural gas plays an important 
role in a region afflicted with an acute sense of energy 
insecurity (discussed below) as states seek to diversify 
the location and type of energy they import (Vivoda and 
Manicom, 2011). These disputes and economic interests 
create the rationale for a greater allocation of state resources 
on the military and on coastal enforcement vessels (Ball, 
1993-1994; Simon, 2005). In particular, many East Asian 
states have fielded greater numbers of modern surface 
ships complete with advanced air-defence capabilities 
and technologically advanced war-fighting capabilities 
(Bitzinger, 2009). Most troubling has been the dramatic rise 
in the number of submarines, particularly by South China 
Sea claimants like Vietnam and Malaysia. Furthermore, a 
number of states have invested considerable funds in the 
development of civilian coast guard authorities. While 
these “white-hulls” are nominally less provocative than 
their military counterparts, it should be noted that the bulk 
of the tensions at sea in the region have occurred when 
these civilian coast guards enforce maritime jurisdiction 
in contested areas. This includes the standoff between 
China and the Philippines at Scarborough Shoal in April 
2012 and a number of confrontations between Chinese and 
Vietnamese vessels.
The proliferation of armed government ships at sea could 
be problematic for a number of reasons. First, and most 
obviously, maritime jurisdiction within maritime East 
Asia is generally contested, so all parties exercise maritime 
jurisdiction against those that claim the same right. Coastal 
states also differ over the degree of authority that can be 
exercised in coastal waters (Manicom, 2010). Secondly, 
despite the growth in activity, there is little transparency 
between regional navies or coast guards, which has led to 
numerous confrontations on regional seas. It is thus only 
a matter of time before a maritime accident turns deadly, 
which risks escalation between claimant states and the 
possible involvement of the United States. Tragically, the 
role of these agencies in maritime boundary disputes 
distracts from the potentially important role that coast 
guard cooperation can play in improving political relations 
while addressing urgent security issues like piracy and 
people smuggling (Bateman, 2003).
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Sea Lanes and Maritime Disputes in East Asia
Indian Ocean Sea Lines of Communication
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These disputes present a long-standing challenge to 
regional stability. Only two territorial disputes in the 
Asia-Pacific have ever been submitted for third-party 
arbitration: the Sipidan/Ligitan dispute between Malaysia 
and Indonesia and the Pedra Branca dispute between 
Singapore and Malaysia. The Philippines recently asked the 
International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea for an opinion 
on China’s “nine-dash line” claim to the South China Sea. 
Although states have employed a number of alternative 
means to sidestep sovereignty issues, including joint 
development zones, the prospects for wide-scale dispute 
resolution remain poor. First, many claimants, including 
China, Japan, South Korea, Vietnam and the Philippines, 
confront serious domestic costs for making concessions 
with rival claimants (Blanchard, 2003). Indeed, some of 
these governments may, in fact, have a political interest in 
the perpetuation of these disputes. Second, from a technical 
standpoint, multiple claimants, overlapping claims and 
regional geography complicate maritime delimitation in 
the Asia-Pacific. Not all South China Sea protagonists claim 
equal parts of the disputed area and some states differ on 
key aspects of UNCLOS itself (Valencia, Van Dyke and 
Ludwig, 1997: 40–77). Third, regional states have only just 
begun to make extended continental shelf claims due to 
delays in UNCLOS processes and the technical difficulties 
of mapping claims. Given the 25-year backlog at the body 
that legitimizes these claims, the Commission on the 
Limits of the Continental Shelf, it will be some time before 
the full scope of East Asia’s maritime claims are clarified.
COMPETITIVE REGIONALISM
A fourth source of strategic instability is the increasingly 
competitive process of regionalism in the Asia-Pacific. 
Multilateral processes in the region have historically been 
seen as supportive of regional stability. The formation 
of ASEAN in 1967 kept the Cold War out of maritime 
Southeast Asia and the growth of both its membership 
and its dialogue partners is perceived by many as a source 
of stability during the 1990s (Acharya, 2001). The creation 
of the ARF in 1994 created a venue for the discussion of 
regional security issues, like the South China Sea dispute, 
and is credited by some for keeping the peace (Haacke, 
2003). However, the seeds of competitive regional 
processes were sown by the region’s growing optimism of 
an “Asian Century” and the collective hardship suffered 
as a consequence of Western policy recommendations after 
the 1997 Asian financial crisis.
This competitive regionalism occurs on two fronts. First, 
the primary strategic rivalry in the region, between China 
and Japan, has coloured the nature of ASEAN-centred 
trade expansion. Efforts to enlarge ASEAN-centred 
trade processes to include China, Japan and South Korea 
(ASEAN+3) have been affected by a contest for leadership 
from both countries. China and Japan advance distinct 
models of regionalism, with the former advocating a 
developmental regionalism that focusses on inclusive 
economic development, while the latter espouses a 
regulatory regionalism that seeks to standardize business 
and economic practice across states and regions (Wesley, 
2007). In addition to these competitive proposals, China 
and Japan have been at pains to conclude separate bilateral 
trade agreements with ASEAN as a whole. 
Second, there is a broader competition between Western-
oriented pan-Pacific regionalism centred on the Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum and the ASEAN-
centred regional processes embodied by ASEAN+3, the 
East Asia Summit and associated meetings. Although 
many of the participants overlap, there are a number 
of features that exacerbate existing regional tensions. 
The trade talks under ASEAN+3 are reminiscent of the 
proposals advanced in the 1990s that excluded Western 
states in direct opposition to APEC. The APEC model 
towards trade liberalization remains far too ambitious 
for most East Asian states, which have decided instead 
to pursue ASEAN-centred trade pacts with different 
combinations of Northeast Asian states (Ravenhill, 2010).
This competitive regionalism is exacerbated by the region’s 
maritime boundary issues and by the growing Sino-US 
strategic rivalry. Chinese investment in ASEAN was a 
low-cost source of soft power for China during the first 
decade of the twenty-first century when contrasted against 
American neglect of ASEAN meetings. The United States, 
however, is aware that regional meetings are an important 
theatre of regional diplomacy, which is why American re-
engagement with Asia began with the ratification of the 
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in 2009. Furthermore, 
regional meetings have become staging grounds for 
diplomatic confrontations over Chinese activities at sea. In 
July 2010, then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton reminded 
the ARF that “legitimate claims to maritime space in the 
South China Sea should be derived solely from legitimate 
claims to land features” (Clinton, 2010). Then Chinese 
Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi reacted angrily, calling the 
remarks an “attack on China” (Chinese Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, 2010). Cambodia, which occupied the rotating 
chair of ASEAN in 2012, was pressured by China not to 
include any mention of maritime tensions in the final 
communiqués of ASEAN-centred meetings.
Most recently, the TPP, an effort to deepen trade ties 
between Brunei, Chile, New Zealand and Singapore, has 
become caught up with regional power politics. Efforts to 
expand the agreement into a Pacific-wide trade area since 
2008 have become controversial because the agreement’s 
draft rules on regulations and on state-owned enterprises 
are seen to be deliberately aimed at excluding China 
(Yuan, 2012). Beijing has, therefore, reinvested in trilateral 
trade talks with South Korea and Japan, and in the 
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (which 
also includes ASEAN plus India, Australia and New 
Zealand) as alternatives to the TPP. There are, of course, 
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limits to just how competitive regional processes need 
to be, given the overlap of partners in the TPP and the 
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, but there 
is no doubt that regional economic prerogatives are driven 
as much by strategic considerations as by economic ones.
THE COLD WAR CONTINUES...
Finally, a more remote source of strategic uncertainty is 
the fact that the Cold War remains unresolved in the Asia-
Pacific. First, the Chinese civil war continues to be manifest 
across the Taiwan Strait and the role of the United States 
as de facto guarantor of Taiwan’s independence continues 
to be an irritant in Sino-US relations, particularly when the 
topic of weapons transfers arises. Despite Washington’s 
commitment to Taiwan under the Taiwan Relations Act 
(TRA), US leaders have been trying to reign in excesses 
on both sides. For example, in 2003, Washington expressed 
displeasure with statements by Taiwan’s pro-independence 
president, Chen Shui-bian (Lin and Snyder, 2003). The 
election of Ma Ying-jeou in 2008 marked the beginning of a 
period of relative calm as both sides of the Strait focussed 
on growing economic and social links between the two 
sides. However, the Chinese interpretation of the China-
US “three communiqués” is one that foresees an eventual 
end of weapons sales to Taiwan, which sits at odds with the 
TRA. Therefore, although the Taiwan issue is not currently 
a pressing matter in regional security, there is no reason 
not to anticipate a resurfacing of tensions in time because 
the parties concerned still disagree about the end state of 
the status of Taiwan (Hickey, 2013; Womack, 2013).
Secondly, the division of the Korean Peninsula continues 
to be a source of tension that extends beyond the 
peninsula and rubs against the burgeoning US-China 
rivalry in the region. China was widely celebrated for its 
central role in driving the first Six-Party Talks on North 
Korean denuclearization in 2003. Subsequently, however, 
it tried to water down UN Security Council resolutions 
on North Korean missile and nuclear tests in 2006 and 
2009 and has not enforced related sanctions. Perpetually 
on the brink of collapse, North Korea seems to have 
successfully transitioned power from Kim Jong-il to his 
son, Kim Jong-un, quite a feat given the factional divisions 
within the country. Despite talk of reform, there has been 
little deviation from the country’s strategy of using its 
missile and nuclear programs to extract aid and other 
concessions from the international community. In early 
2013, following a third nuclear test, Beijing seemed fed 
up with North Korea. It supported UN Security Council 
Resolution 2094 and was rumoured to slow trade with 
North Korea (Associated Press, 2013). This is a marked 
turn from a year prior, when several senior Chinese 
leaders visited Pyongyang to show their support for Kim 
Jong-un. Beijing was also reluctant to criticize the North 
after it sank a South Korean frigate (the Cheonan), killing 
46 sailors, and shelled Yeonpyeong Island, killing four, 
including two civilians. These two crises in 2010 serve as 
harsh reminders that tensions on the Korean Peninsula can 
escalate at any time. Following the February 2013 nuclear 
test, Washington took the unusual step of clearly restating 
its extended deterrent commitments to South Korea and 
Japan, including the symbolic decision to publicize B-52 
and B-2 bomber flights over the Korean Peninsula. This 
comes amidst growing calls in both Korea and Japan for a 
re-examination of their respective nuclear postures. While 
these latest rounds of tensions could be little more than the 
sabre-rattling that typically follows the inauguration of a 
new South Korean president, Pyongyang’s rhetoric seems 
particularly provocative. At the time of writing, it pledged 
to rebuild the Yongbyon reactor in an effort to produce 
more fissile material, and is expected to conduct another 
ballistic missile test.
Both challenges, combined with the potential 
destabilization of the region’s maritime boundary 
disputes, have led to a dramatic reorientation of Japanese 
security policy. North Korean provocations and, more 
recently, Chinese maritime activities near Japan have led 
to a modest increase in support for a loosening of the 
restrictions of the use of force by Japanese forces (Samuels, 
2007). US-Japan security relations have also been modified 
to reflect growing challenges in the Taiwan Strait and in 
the region in each successive restatement of their security 
guidelines. As a result, in the seven decades since it 
renounced the right to fight wars or engage in collective 
security operations, Japan has developed East Asia’s most 
technologically advanced military, has participated in 
maritime security operations in the Gulf of Aden and off the 
coast of Afghanistan, and is the most important American 
ally in East Asia. The strategic challenges outlined above 
will continue to drive Japan’s slow evolution to a “normal” 
military power, despite Japan’s considerable economic 
and demographic challenges.
NON-TRADITIONAL SECURITY 
CHALLENGES 
In addition to these strategic-level threats, there are 
other sources of instability that directly affect the 
interests of regional states: energy and food insecurity, 
climate catastrophes and the emerging issue of cyber 
security (Dupont, 2001). Asian countries are consuming 
increasingly vast amounts of energy every year, which, 
due to the region’s relative poverty in primary energy 
sources, is met with imported supplies. The Asia-Pacific 
region consumes 39 percent of global energy, but has less 
than three percent of global oil resources and eight percent 
of global gas resources (British Petroleum, 2012). In as 
much as Asian importers need access to sufficient energy 
supplies at affordable prices to ensure energy security 
and economic growth, the spectre of supply disruption is 
disturbing to policy makers (Yergin, 1988: 111). Supply-
side threats to Asian energy security are vast, and can 
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be divided into two categories: state-based threats and 
non-state threats. State-based threats include situations 
in which a state actor somewhere along the supply chain 
deliberately attempts to disrupt the flow of energy. These 
include politically motivated market manipulation by 
supplier states, naval blockade of SLOCs by a rival state 
(amidst a wider political crisis) or hoarding of supplies 
by another state. No less severe, non-state threats include 
disruption along the supply chain due to terrorist attack 
or piracy, natural disasters and demand fluctuations 
in energy-importing states. Problematically, although 
a growing number of East Asian states are net energy 
importers, the common interest in preventing a supply 
disruption to the region as a whole has not yet yielded the 
creation of institutional mechanisms to mitigate supply-
side threats. The shift to net importer status by Southeast 
Asian states also limits their capacity to act as sources of 
diversification for Northeast Asian states (Thomson, 2006).
The Asia-Pacific confronts a number of sources of food 
insecurity, including declining agricultural production 
driven by the rapid urbanization and industrialization 
that is associated with economic development (Timmer, 
2012). Higher incomes triggered a shift from a diet based 
on carbohydrates and vegetables to one based on protein 
and fat. Protection of dwindling agricultural sectors has 
reduced food productivity in Asia, which led to price 
increases, and reduced access to affordable food among 
vulnerable segments of society, including the poor, children 
and the sick (UN Economic and Social Commission for 
Asia and the Pacific, 2009: 8). Price spikes in global food 
prices after 2008, driven by higher input prices, including 
petrochemicals, and by the growing frequency of extreme 
weather events in fertile areas have exacerbated the 
problem. 
Food insecurity is a man-made phenomenon, attributable 
to mismanagement of the agricultural sector, trade policy 
(protectionism), the energy sector (allocating farmland 
to biofuels) and the oil market, as well as inadequate 
responses to climate change. In a globalized economy, the 
solutions to these interrelated problems are necessarily 
multilateral. For instance, ASEAN+3 has a working group 
on food security and has taken steps to coordinate its 
rice reserves. In 2009, ASEAN developed a five-year plan 
of action on food security that facilitated coordination 
between agriculture ministries. There is, however, little 
coordination between these regional efforts and global 
organizations like the FAO (Su, Weng and Chiu, 2009). 
APEC regularly holds meetings of its energy ministers and 
its Energy Working Group (EWG) is the only body where 
East Asian states that have strategic petroleum reserves 
can discuss their coordination: China’s status as a non-
democracy keeps it out of the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development and, by extension, the 
International Energy Agency. Indeed, the EWG holds 
regular consultations on matters designed to improve 
energy security in the Asia-Pacific region such as sea-lane 
security and the creation of a Pacific pipeline network 
(Ryan, 2005: 299-300).
Food and energy insecurity are tied up with issues of 
how states mitigate and adapt to global climate change. A 
warming climate will exacerbate already poor agricultural 
conditions in some parts of the Asia-Pacific, while energy 
consumption patterns in the region may, in time, be 
influenced by renewable energy sources. Climate change 
has already had damaging effects on agricultural yields 
and fresh water levels across the region. The fact that 
East Asian populations and, by extension, their energy 
infrastructure, are concentrated on coastlines increases 
the likelihood that they will be damaged by the storms 
that afflict the region. As a product of industrialization 
and urbanization, the material cost of natural disasters 
has more than doubled in the period between 1995 and 
2004 compared to the 10 years prior in China, increased 
tenfold in Japan and ninefold in South Korea (Partnerships 
in the Environmental Management of the Seas of East 
Asia, 2005). Natural disasters threaten energy security in 
two ways. They can cause price spikes, increasing the cost 
of energy, and they can damage infrastructure and limit 
the ability of governments to distribute energy, including 
electricity (Energy Security Study Group, 2006: 10). This 
was tragically demonstrated by the earthquake and 
tsunami that struck Japan in March 2011.
East Asian states are embarking on climate change 
mitigation strategies. According to the World Bank, the 
bulk of these strategies focus on reducing energy intensity 
and investing in renewable energy (World Bank, 2009: 6). 
Beyond energy policy, East Asian states seek to protect 
forests and ensure that the region’s rapid industrialization 
occurs in a sustainable way (World Bank, 2009: 7). Although 
criticized for its reluctance to accept binding emission 
reduction targets, China has, since 2005, launched several 
policy initiatives designed to improve energy efficiency 
and reduce energy intensity. Importantly, recent initiatives 
now reward local officials for implementing climate-
friendly policies, in an important departure from the 
traditional incentive structure, which favoured greater 
economic growth as the primary criterion for promotion.
These mitigation efforts are likely a product of the marked 
increase in extreme weather events across the Asia-Pacific 
over the past two decades. The frequency of meteorological 
disasters in the period 2001–2010 increased 66 percent 
over the previous decade (Asian Development Bank, 
2012). In addition to high death tolls and the high costs of 
reconstruction, these events can also increase the number 
of people displaced, which in turn has implications for 
nearby cities and countries and the region as a whole. 
Low-lying areas like Bangladesh and the Philippines are 
particularly vulnerable, although most East Asian cities 
are in low-lying areas near the coast. It is thus unsurprising 
that US Pacific Forces commander Admiral Samuel 
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Locklear recently described climate-related disruptions as 
the most probable security challenge in East Asia (Bender, 
2013). These problems are exacerbated by the poor 
adaptive capacity on the part of many East Asian states 
(Habib, 2010). Higher population densities and lower 
incomes define those populations most vulnerable to 
climate-related disasters (Thomas, Albert and Perez, 2012: 
7). Low- and middle-income countries are more vulnerable 
to climate-related disasters because they lack the resources 
necessary to prepare for them, to provide prompt relief 
and rebuild afterwards. Vulnerability to disasters can be 
reduced by improving infrastructure and adopting modern 
building codes, as well as by rationalized urban planning 
and improved modelling of shifting weather patterns.
The emerging issue of cyber security, and of Internet 
governance more broadly, presents a challenge to regional 
security as well. Revelations by a private security firm 
that cyber attacks on American businesses were traced 
to China has raised the profile of the issue by providing 
the most public attribution to China thus far (Mandiant, 
2013). Concerns abound that the United States and China 
may engage is some form of a “cyber arms race” unless 
rules and protocols are established. This comes at a time 
of growing international attention to the governance of 
the Internet as it relates to intellectual property, political 
freedoms and the security of critical financial and other 
infrastructure. This debate already seems to pit Western 
countries against authoritarian ones, reinforcing existing 
cleavages in the international system, as well as in East 
Asia. Multiple estimates place the Asia-Pacific as the 
leading place of origin for cyber attacks (French, 2013).
These challenges risk overwhelming the crowded non-
traditional security agenda in the Asia-Pacific region. 
Weak state governance in parts of Southeast Asia creates 
the opportunity for terrorists and transnational criminal 
networks to thrive. Simultaneously, counterterrorism 
activities have driven closer cooperation, for example, 
between Australia and Indonesia. Along with transnational 
crime, counterterrorism has also been part of Canada’s 
regional diplomatic strategy. For example, Canada chaired 
an ARF Inter-sessional Meeting on Counter-Terrorism 
and Transnational Crime in 2011 and continues to have 
dialogues on these matters with India and China. Human 
and drug smuggling, piracy and money laundering are 
also sources of concern and corresponding diplomatic 
activism by Canada and Australia. 
CONCLUSION
These sources of strategic tension raise a number of policy 
challenges for Canada and Australia. Both are resource-
based economies with a track record of bilateral and 
institutional engagement in the Asia-Pacific, and both 
are key US allies. They therefore have an interest in the 
regional strategic stability that allows economic growth 
to flourish. As stable sources of energy, minerals and 
agricultural products, economic synergies exist between 
Canada, Australia and the region that could help alleviate 
regional energy and food pressures in the Asia-Pacific. 
Canada and Australia are both concerned about non-
traditional security issues and have made addressing these 
a key component of their regional diplomacy. The climate 
pressures described above may, in the future, exacerbate 
issues of human migration. Finally, given the region’s 
centrality in global supply chains, the deterioration of any 
of the challenges noted above presents a grave threat to 
the global economy. Although Canadian and Australian 
regional strategies are characterized by a number of 
differences that relate to the countries’ distinct historical 
and cultural backgrounds, as well as their proximity to the 
United States, there is considerable scope for cooperation 
on strategic challenges in the Asia-Pacific that should 
be explored in depth and fully maximized (Asia Pacific 
Foundation of Canada, 2012; Manicom and O’Neil, 2012).
The author would like to thank Len Edwards, Fen Hampson 
and, in particular, Tanya Ogilvie-White for comments on earlier 
drafts of this paper.
ACRONYMS
APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
ARF ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CCP Chinese Communist Party 
EEZ exclusive economic zone
EWG Energy Working Group
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization (UN)
PLA People’s Liberation Army 
SLOCs sea lanes of communication 
TPP Trans-Pacific Partnership
TRA Taiwan Relations Act
UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law  
 of the Sea
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